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The  earnings  of  low-skill  workers  have  suffered  substantial  declines  since  the  mid  1970’s.  The 
conventional  explanation  is that  a technology-induced  increase  in  skill  requirements  has 
resulted  in  a growing  mismatch  between  the  skills  demanded  by  firms  and  those  supplied  by 
the  workforce:  declining  demand  for  low-skill  workers  led  to  falling  relative  (and  real)  wages. 
But  neither  statistical  nor  case  study  evidence  indicates  that  this  period  was  characterized  by  a 
fundamental,  economy-wide  transformation  in  production  technology  or  by  a shift  in  the  long- 
term  upward  trend  in  skill  requirements  whose  timing  and  magnitude  could  account  for  the 
wage  restructuring.  What  the  evidence  does  suggest  is  that  the  collapse  in  wages  was  largely 
unrelated  to  skill  restructuring.  In  the  face  of  sharply  increasing  competition,  employers 
adopted  a  “low-road”  strategy  aimed  above  all  at  reducing  labor  costs,  through  wage  conces- 
sions  from  workers,  the  replacement  of  full-time  with  part-time  and  temporary  workers,  an 
increased  reliance  on  low-wage  outside  contractors,  and  relocation  to  low-wage  sites  - a 
human  resource  strategy  that  was  facilitated  by  rising  supplies  of  workers  willing  to  accept 
low  wages  (e.g.,  displaced  high-wage  workers  and  low-skill  immigrants)  and  a variety  of 
government  policies.  The  mismatch  appears  to  be  less  between  skills  demanded  and  skills 
supplied  than  between  skills  demanded  and  wages  paid.  This  suggests  that  while  there  is  a 
need  to  improve  our  education  and  training  system,  improving  worker  skills  will  not,  by  itself, 
have  much  impact  on  the  distribution  of  earnings. -  l- 
After  rising  steadily  for  almost  three  decades,  the  real  weekly  pay  of  production  workers 
has  collapsed  since  1973,  falling  by  an  extraordinary  20  percent.  While  real  earnings  fell 
continuously  over  these  last  two  decades,  almost  three-quarters  of  the  decline  took  place  prior 
to  1983.’  This  decline  in  living  standards  has  coincided  in  the  1980’s  with  a sharp  drop  in 
the  relative  wages  of  low-skilled  male  workers  and  contributed  to  an  unprecedented  surge  in 
earnings  inequality.  The  mean  earnings  of  employed  male  high  school  graduates  fell  by  about 
12 percent  between  1979  and  1989,  from  $28,400  to  $25,018.  For  those  with  jobs  and  just  9- 
11 years  of  education,  the  earnings  collapse  was  almost  twice  as  large,  about  23  percent, 
falling  fi-om  $23,900  in  1979  to  $18,400  in  1989.  At  the  same  time,  the  incidence  of  “low 
earnings”  (defined  as the  poverty  line  for  a family  of  four)  doubled  between  1979  and  1989 
for  employed  male  high  school  graduates,  increasing  from  8 to  15 percent;  for  men  with  only 
some  high  school,  the  share  of  the  workforce  with  poverty-wage  earnings  more  than  doubled, 
rising  from  13 to  30  percent.  The  problem  of  low-earnings  was  substantially  worse  for  black 
and  Hispanic  men:  25  percent  of  all  employed  black  men  and  41  percent  of  all  employed 
Hispanic  men  with  less  than  a high  school  degree  earned  poverty-level  incomes  in  1989  (Acs 
and  Danziger,  1993:  Tables  1 and  3). 
The  conventional  explanation  for  this  disastrous  labor  market  performance  is  that  a 
fundamental  shift  has  taken  place  in  the  mix  of  skills  required  in  the  workplace.  As  the 
demand  for  low-skill  workers  has  declined,  a growing  mismatch  developed  between  the  skills 
demanded  by  firms  and  those  supplied  by  the  workforce.  The  result  is  declining  relative 
earnings.  Recent  trends  in  unemployment  rates,  labor  market  participation  rates  and  real 
wages  for  low-skilled  workers  have  been  frequently  cited  in  the  professional  literature  in 
support  of  this  mismatch  thesis.  Chinchui  Juhn  (1992:99)  concludes  from  these  aggregate 
trends,  for  example,  that  “job  market  opportunities  have  .  .  . deteriorated  significantly  for  less- 
skilled  workers.”  Similarly,  Topel  (1993: 110)  finds  that  “virtually  all  of  the  long-tern  increase 
in joblessness  occurs  among  low-wage  men,”  and  concludes  that  the  best  explanation  is  “a 
‘Real  weekly  earnings  dropped  from  $3 15 in  1973  to  $292  in  1979,  falling  f%rther  to 
$272  in  1983,  $264  in  1989  and  $255  in  1992  (Economic  Report  of  the  President,  199 1: 
Table  B-44;  Monthly  Labor  Review,  July  1993). -2- 
secular  decline  in  the  demand  for  less-skilled  workers.”  Referring  to  the  rise  in  the  wage 
premium  for  more  educated  workers,  Murphy  and  Welch  (1993a:  109)  state  that  “we  view 
these  changes  as  indicating  increasing  demand  for  general  discretionary  skills.”  Secretary  of 
Labor  Reich  (1993),  citing  evidence  of  rising  shares  of  poverty-wage  workers  and  growing 
wage  inequality,  has  written  that  “The  long-term  crisis  in  advanced  industrial  nations  reflects 
in  part  a  shift  in  relative  labor  demand  against  less-educated  workers  and  those  doing  routine 
tasks  and  toward  workers  with  problem-solving  skills.” 
The  most  common  explanation  for  this  shift  in  the  demand  for  skills,  at  least  among 
economists,  is  technological  change.  Although  their  statistical  tests  did  not  include  direct 
measures  of  technological  change,  Bound  and  Johnson  (1992:371)  assert  that  the  “major  cause 
(of  relative  wage  changes  in  the  1980’s)  was  a shift  in  the  skill  structure  of  labor  demand 
brought  about  by  biased  technological  change.”  Similarly,  Acs  and  Danziger  (1993:632) 
conclude  that  since  most  of  the  decline  in  earnings  is  found  within  industries  for  workers  with 
the  same  education  and  experience  levels  and  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the  standard 
measures  used  in  earnings  studies,  “changes  in  technology,  whether  autonomous  or  in 
response  to  foreign  competition,  provide  the  most  plausible  explanation  for  the  fall  in  mean 
earnings.”  The  implication  of  the  mismatch  explanation  is that  the  rising  incidence  of  low- 
wages  and  the  growth  of  earnings  inequality  over  the  last  two  decades  in  the  U.S.  are  the 
natural  and  impersonal  consequences  of  the  interaction  of  technical  progress  and  market 
forces. 
If  this  diagnosis  is  correct  - that  unlike  previous  decades,  technological  change  in  the 
1980’s  has  dramatically  shifted  the  demand  for  labor  in  favor  of  high-skilled  workers, 
resulting  in  a growing  share  of  poverty-wage  workers  - the  prescription  is  straightforward:  we 
must  increase  the  number  and  quality  of  applicants  for  the  growing  pool  of  high  skilled  jobs. 
The  answer,  in  short,  is  the  standard  supply-side  remedy  of  more  and  better  education  and 
training.  Indeed,  the  implication  of  the  mismatch  story  is  that  we  are  twenty  years  too  late:  a 
choice  to  invest  more  heavily  in  skills  back  in  the  1970’s  could  have  alleviated  the  skill 
mismatch  and  fundamentally  altered  the  course  of  future  earnings  trends.  Given  the  nature  of 
technological  advance,  the  nation  effectively  “chose”  a low-wage  path  by  failing  to  invest  the 
resources  necessary  to  increase  the  literacy  of  a large  segment  of  the  working  age  population. -3- 
It  is  revealing  in  this  regard  that  the  Commission  on  the  Skills  of  the  American  Workforce 
(1990)  entitled  their  extremely  influential  report  “America’s  Choice:  High  Skills  or  Low 
Wages!.  ”  In  order  to  cope  with  what  he  has  termed  “the  mismatch  between  the  skills  Ameri- 
cans  have  and  the  skills  the  economy  requires,”  Secretary  Reich  (1993)  has  called  on  workers 
to  “Get  Smart.”  To  facilitate  skill  upgrading,  the  “Clinton  agenda  for  the  workforce”  proposes 
five  policies:  improved  basic  education,  more  affordable  college,  school  to  work  apprentice- 
ships,  training  for  displaced  workers,  and  incentives  for  lifetime  learning  in  the  workplace. 
These  are  admirable  goals  and  their  implementation  will  surely  contribute  to  a more 
competitive  America  sometime  in  the  21st  century.  But  as  Section  1 will  attempt  to  demon- 
strate,  skill  mismatch  does  not  adequately  explain  the  recent  earnings  problems  of  low-skill 
workers.  There  is  little  evidence  to  support  the  notion  that  the  earnings  problems  of  the  last 
two  decades  stem  from  a failure  to  make  workers  “smarter”  in  response  to  a technologically- 
induced  shift  in  the  demand  for  skills  by  employers.  While  the  expansion  of  “problem- 
solving”  jobs  is  real,  the  transformation  of  the  skill  distribution  is  gradual  and  part  of  a 
century-long  trend.  Indeed,  if  declining  demand  due  to  new  workplace  technologies  was  the 
major  source  of  the  falling  relative  wages  for  low-skilled  workers,  the  rate of  decline  in  the 
relative  earnings  of  these  workers  should  have  become  progressively  worse  over  the  last  two 
decades,  which  is  not  what  the  data  show.  It  should  also  be  recognized  that  our  economic 
competitors,  such  as  France  and  Japan,  who  are  introducing  the  same  workplace  technologies. 
have  not  experienced  anything  like  the  same  explosion  in  earnings  inequality  and  collapse  in 
real  earnings  at  the  bottom  of  the  skill  distribution  (see  Katz,  Loveman,  and  Blanchflower, 
1993).2 
The  uniqueness  of  the  post-1973  period  was  not  an  unusually  strong  shift  in  demand 
away  from  low-skill  jobs,  reducing  job  opportunities  and  lowering  wages,  but  rather  a 
dramatic  growth  in  the  demand  for  low-wage workers.  Section  2 describes  employment 
trends  over  this  period.  These  trends  offer  little  support  to  the  thesis  that  there  was  a sharp 
21t is  interesting  that  Great  Britain,  with  a  strong  legacy  of  hostile  employer-employee 
relations  and  not  among  the  leaders  in  the  use  of  computer-based  production  technologies, 
does  show  earnings  patterns  similar  to  the  U.S.. -4- 
decline  in  low-skill  job  opportunities  in  the  last  decade  and  a half,  or  that  this  decline 
worsened  over  the  period,  which  is  implied  by  the  technological  change  explanation.  While 
the  conventional  view  assumes,  or  is  at least  consistent  with,  the  simple  competitive  model  of 
the  labor  market  in  which  skill  and  wage  distributions  are  equivalent,3  the  skill  and  wage 
distributions  for  nonsupervisory  workers  are  in  fact  substantially  different  (see  Howell  and 
Wolff,  1991a);  furthermore,  skill  and  wage  trends  for  nonsupervisory  workers  did  not  corre- 
spond  in  the  1980’s:  while  the  cognitive  skills  supplied  by  workers  and  required  on-the-job 
continued  a long-term  secular  increase,  their  relative  and  real  wages  sharply  declined.  If 
technological  change  biased  the  demand  for  labor  away  from  those  with  low  skills,  and  we 
take  seriously  the  conventional  assumption  that  the  wage  distribution  reflects  the  skill 
distribution,  there  should  have  been  a decline  in  the  share  of  workers  with  low-wage  jobs  and 
steadily  rising  rates  of joblessness  among  the  low-skilled  throughout  the  1980’s  as  computer- 
based  systems  became  more  widely  and  effectively  used.  But  the  data  show  large  increases  in 
low-wage  jobs,  in  goods  as well  as  service  industries,  and  joblessness  did  not  increase  after 
the  recessions  of  1980-82.  In  fact,  the  last  decade  and  a half  has  made  it  abundantly  clear  that 
the  choice  concerning  the  nonsupervisory  workforce  is  not  limited  to  high  skills  or  low  wages 
- the  current  trajectory  is  towards  gradually  higher  skills  with  dramatically  lower  wages. 
A  convincing  account  of  the  massive  wage  restructuring  since  the  mid  1970’s  requires 
looking  much  more  closely  at what  has  happened  to  “wage-setting  institutions.”  Although  the 
main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  question  the  adequacy  of  the  mismatch  story,  Section  3 will 
outline  an  “institutionalist”  alternative.  In  brief,  employers  in  the  1970’s  and  1980’s,  facing 
increasingly  competitive  product  markets,  abundant  supplies  of  low-skill  workers  and  a 
comfortable  ideological  climate,  chose  a variant  of  the  “low-road”  human  resource  strategy, 
one  that  aimed  above  all  to  substantially  reduce  labor  costs  in  the  short  run.  Companies 
demanded  wage  and  benefits  concessions  and  “downsized”  by  slashing  the  number  of  full- 
3This  is  made  explicit  in  many  studies.  For  example,  describing  his  methodology  for 
examining  the  incidence  of  unemployment  across  skill  groups,  Topel(1993:  110)  writes  that  “I 
will  define  relative  marketable  ‘skills’  in  terms  of  a person’s  position  in  the  overall  distribu- 
tion  of  wages.”  Similarly,  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches  (19935)  confidently  assert  that 
“Changes  in  the  wage  bill  share  will  reflect  changes  in  relative  skill  levels.” -5- 
time  employees,  whose  earnings  had  been  determined  under  union  contracts  or  within 
structured  internal  labor  markets,  and  replaced  them  with  part-time  and  temporary  workers. 
The  same  objective  was  achieved  by  contracting  out  to  low-wage  suppliers.  Skill  obsolescence 
due  to  technological  change  played  at  most  a supporting  role  in  this  restructuring.  But  in 
addition,  technology  may  have  contributed  to  the  wage  collapse  via  the  supply  side:  new 
computer-based  technologies  have  helped  facilitate  a reduction  in  staffing  requirements  for 
moderately  skilled  white-collar  workers  (e.g.,  lower-level  managers  and  their  clerical  staff) 
many  of  whom,  together  with  legions  of  displaced  high-wage  blue-collar  workers  and  sharply 
rising  numbers  of  low-skill  foreign  workers,  became  part  of  a rising  supply  of  workers 
competing  in  the  low-skill  labor  market. 
1.  Skill  Mismatch  - A  Preliminary  Assessment  of  the  Evidence 
It  seems  almost  universally  accepted  in  the  labor  economics  literature  that  the  deterioration 
in  the  earnings  status  of  most  nonsupervisory  workers  over  the  last  two  decades  is best  ex- 
plained  by  a  shift  in  skill  requirements  which,  in  turn,  led  to  a sharply  declining  demand  for 
low  skilled  workers.  Reflecting  this  conventional  view  in  their  survey  of  the  recent  earnings 
literature,  Levy  and  Mumane  (1992: 1372)  state  that  “Declines  in  the  relative  demand  for  less 
educated  workers  occurred  within  industries  - most  dramatically  within  manufacturing  where 
semi-skilled  jobs  declined  at  a much  faster  rate  than  overall  manufacturing  employment. 
These  declines  played  a key  role  in  explaining  both  the  loss  in  real  earnings  for  young  high 
school  graduates  and  high  school  dropouts,  and  the  increase  in  the  gap  between  the  earnings 
of  high  school  graduates  and  college  graduates.” 
This  claim,  that  declining  demand  for  low-skill  workers  played  a key  role  in  shaping 
recent  earnings  trends,  is  quite  common  but  the  statistical  tests  that  appear  in  the  research 
they  survey  do  not  (and  were  not  designed  to)  establish  this  link.  Indeed,  just  two  paragraphs 
later,  Levy  and  Mumane  (1992:  1372)  write  that  “To  date,  solid  evidence  on  the  nature  and 
extent  of  this  (skill)  mismatch  is  hard  to  come  by.”  Perhaps  more  fundamentally,  the 
important  empirical  question  is  not  whether  there  has  been  an  overall  decline  in  demand,  but 
whether  it  was  so  much  greater  in  magnitude  than  changes  in  previous  decades  that  it  could 
plausibly  account  for  the  unique  wage  restructuring  we  have  observed  since  the  mid  1970’s. -6- 
The  recent  earnings  literature  has  not  focused  on  this  question. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  semi-skilled  jobs  have  declined  in  manufacturing,  but  it  is  less 
obvious  that  all,  or  most,  industries  have  experienced  large  declines  in  low-skill  jobs.  Some 
low-skilled  jobs  in  some  industries  have  clearly  grown  - for  example,  while  male  employment 
increased  by  13.6  percent  between  1983  and  1988,  male  Sales  Workers in  retail  and  personal 
services  increased  by  16.4  percent  and  male  guards  increased  by  over  20  percent  (U.S. 
Department  of  Labor,  1989).  Nor  does  the  timing  appear  consistent  with  this  story.  Berman, 
Bound  and  Griliches  (1993:2)  present  data  showing  an  increase  in  the  nonproduction  share  of 
employment  as  evidence  that  there  was  substantial  skill  upgrading  in  the  1980’s:  “Between 
1979  and  1989  the  employment  of  production  workers  in  U.S.  manufacturing  dropped  by  a 
dramatic  15 percent  from  14.5  to  12.3  million,  while  non-production  employment  rose  3 
percent  from  6.5  to  6.7  million.”  But  as  their  Figure  1 clearly  indicates,  all  of  this  “skill 
upgrading”  took  place  in just  3 years  -  1980,  1981  and  1982:  the  nonproduction  share  of 
employment  in  1989  was  identical  to  the  share  in  1983.  These  results  look  less  like  a trend 
characterizing  the  1980’s  than  a one-time  shock  during  a three  year  period  of  back-to-back 
recessions.  Yet,  the  decline  in  relative  wages  of  low-skilled  workers  as  well  as  the  growth  in 
inequality  continued  throughout  the  1980’s.  The  implications  of  this  timing  for  a technologi- 
cal  change  explanation,  which  is  advanced  by  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches,  is  considered 
below. 
Part  of  the  confusion  in  this  discussion  is  that  not  all  “less-educated”  workers  are  em- 
ployed  in  similar  jobs,  and  semi-skilled  manufacturing  jobs  are  a particularly  poor  example  of 
the  presumed  across-the-board  decline  in  demand  for  low-skilled  workers  since  they  tend  to 
be  much  better  paid  than  most.  In  previous  work  I distinguished  semi-skilled  manual  occupa- 
tions  from  “routine”  manual  occupations  on  the  basis  of  both  motor  skills  and  cognitive  skills 
scores  from  the  Dictionary  of  Ocupational  Titles.  The  employment  data  show  that  semi- 
skilled  jobs  have  declined  sharply  since  1950,  with  the  greatest  percentage  declines  in  the 
1970’s  and  early  1980’s.  But  routine  manual  jobs  (such  as  stock  handlers,  cleaning  service, 
and  food  service  workers)  which  pay  much  less  and  have  lower  cognitve  skill  requirements 
(and  lower  average  educational  attainment  levels)  declined  less than  semi-skilled  jobs  in  the -7- 
1970’s  and  actually  increased  slightly in  their  share  of  total  employment  in  the  1980’s 
(Howell  and  Wolff,  1991b).  As  this  suggests,  and  Section  2  will  further  demonstrate,  recent 
employment  trends  do  not  support  the  notion  that  there  was  an  unusually  strong  decline 
demand  for  low-skill  workers  in  the  1980’s. 
“Declining  demand”  might,  however,  be  interpreted  not  in  terms  of job  opportunities 
in 
which  can  be  measured  by  employment  trends  but  in  terms  of  value  (marginal  productivity)  to 
employers.  Technological  change  may  have  deskilled  - but  not  yet  displaced  - large  shares  of 
low-skilled  workers,  resulting  in  stable  or  growing  employment  but  declining  relative  and  real 
earnings.  But  if  wages  really  reflect  relative  skills  (see  footnote  3),  growing  earnings  inequal- 
ity  within  industries  should  be  associated  with  widening  skill  differentials. 
But  the  data  show  little  support  for  this  expectation.  Building  upon  earlier  research  by 
Karoly  (1992),  Wieler  (1993)  finds  that  changes  in  both  worker  characteristics  (such  as 
education  or  experience)  and  skill  requirements  due  to  shifts  in  the  occupation  mix  of 
employment  do  a poor  job  of  accounting  for  the  steady  increase  in  earnings  inequality  within 
industries  observed  throughout  the  1980’s.  Particularly  striking  are  the  results  at  the  industry 
level.  Figures  2a,  2b  and  2c  report  the  variance  of  hourly  earnings,  educational  attainment, 
and  three  measures  of  skill  requirements  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles  for  each 
year  from  1975  through  1990  for  three  industries  that  experienced  dramatic  increases  in 
earnings  inequality.  Figure  2a  shows  that  the  variance  of  hourly  earnings  in  the  Auto  industry 
increased  from  .190  to  .298  over  this  period,  almost  all  of  which  took  place  after  1979.  Yet, 
the  skill  measures  all  show  remarkable  stability  - the  data  show  no  evidence  of  a growing 
dispersion  of  skill  levels  that  parallels  the  rapid  growth  in  earnings  inequality.  The  same 
results  can  be  seen  in  Figure  2b  (Electrical  Equipment)  and  Figure  2c  (Business  Services). 
Despite  the  apparent  circularity  (since  we  are  trying  to  explain  the  massive  wage  restruc- 
turing),  the  evidence  for  changes  in  the  mix  of  skills  demanded  in  the  workplace  is  usually 
limited  to  relative  wage  trends.  But  are  wage  trends  a reliable  guide  to  changes  in  the  demand 
for  skills?  There  is,  as  mentioned  above,  little  evidence  that  the  wage  distribution  is  a good 
(much  less  perfect)  proxy  for  the  skill  distribution,  whether  skills  are  measured  by  cognitive 
skills,  motor  skills  or  interactive  (“people”)  skills,  particularly  for  nonsupervisory  occupations 
(Howell  and  Wolff,  199 la).  While  it  is true  that,  all  else  equal,  more  education  tends  to  be -8- 
associated  with  higher  earnings,  all  else  is not  equal;  many  other  factors  are  equally  or  even 
more  important  for  wage  determination,  including  gender,  race,  union  coverage,  firm  size  and 
industry  of  employment  (see  Groshen,  1991).  One  only  has  to  ask,  for  example,  why  most 
nonsupervisory  jobs  dominated  by  women  pay  substantially  less  than  those  dominated  by  men 
despite  far  higher  average  educational  attainment  required  in  the  “female  jobs.”  And  if  these 
“female  jobs”  happen  to  be  increasingly  located  in  small  firms  in  competitive  industries,  they 
will  tend  to  pay  even  less  over  time,  even  if  their  relative  skill  levels  have  risen.  In  addition, 
wage-setting  may  be  affected  by  less  measurable  factors  like  employer  and  employee 
militance,  changes  in  collective  bargaining  laws,  and  changes  in  the  enforcement  of  govem- 
ment  regulations  affecting  earnings  and  conditions  of  work. 
High  unemployment  and  nonparticipation  rates  have  also  been  cited  as  evidence  of  a 
declining  demand  for  low-skill  workers  (see  Juhn,  1992;  Topel,  1993).  But  the  low-skilled 
have  always  shown  higher  unemployment  and  nonparticipation  rates  than  higher  skilled 
workers,  for  obvious  reasons;  one  is  that  the jobs  available  to  lower  skill  workers  are  not  as 
good  and  there  is  less  incentive  to  maintain  a stable  employment  record.  The  worsening  of 
these  rates  may  occur  independently  of  changes  in  the  demand  for  low-skill  workers  through 
increases  in  competition  from  new  sources  of  labor  suppIy  (increases  in  female  participation, 
demographic  shifts  that  increase  the  numbers  of  young  workers  in  the  labor  market,  displace- 
ment  of  higher  wage  workers,  and  rising  numbers  of  low-skilled  foreign  workers)  or  as  a 
result  of  a decline  in job  quality  (e.g.,  falling  earnings  and  benefits  or  rising  job  insecurity). 
Both  factors  are  likely  to  have  been  at  work  since  the  early  1970’s:  employer  wage  and 
employment  policies  and  the  crowding  of  workers  into  the  secondary  labor  market  tended  to 
lower  the  quality  of  secondary  jobs,  increasing  joblessness  through  higher  turnover  (as 
workers  search  for  better  jobs)  and  rising  numbers  of  discouraged  workers.  This,  however,  is 
not  the  usual  explanation  in  recent  studies  of joblessness.  The  conclusion  that  declining 
demand  for  low-skill  workers  is the  source  of  the  problem  may,  again,  be  traced  in  part  to  the 
assumption  that  skill  and  wage  distributions  are  identical4 
41f skill  levels  are  defined  by  the  wages  a worker  is  paid,  a decline  in  wages  appears  as  a 
decline  in  skill  (skill  obsolescence)  and,  consequently,  a decline  in  demand  for  those  skills;  if -9- 
Methodology  aside,  it  is  worth  noting  that  in  fact  the  employment/population  ratio  did  not 
decline  in  the  1980’s.  As  Juhn’s  (1992:Figure  3)  data  show,  participation  rates  for  both  white 
and  black  male  high  school  dropouts  and  high  school  graduates  w  steadily  from  1982,  a 
recession  year,  to  1987.  For  young  (20-24)  black  males  - a demographic  group  as  likely  as 
any  to  be  negatively  affected  by  a declining  demand  for  low  skill  workers  - the  employed 
share  of  the  population  fell  sharply  from  72.6%  in  1973  to  65.5%  in  1979,  and  then  dropped 
precipitously  to  53.9%  in  1982  (due  mainly  to  the  effects  of  the  two  recessions),  but  has  risen 
steadily  throughout  the  1980’s,  reaching  63.9%  in  1988  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  1989, 
Table  16).  In  short,  the  decline  in  employment  rates  between  1973  and  1988  for  these 
workers  took  pace  almost  entirely  before  1982.  Again,  if  the  problem  is  skill  mismatch  due  to 
the  increasing  skill  requirements  of  new  workplace  technologies,  why  did  most  of  the  change 
take  place  in  the  1970’s  and  not  in  the  mid  and  late  1980’s? 
A  strong  case  for  skill  mismatch  as  the  explanation  for  the  earnings  problems  of  low 
skilled  workers  in  the  1980’s  requires  more  than  simply  evidence  of  declining  relative  wages 
and  low  employment  rates.  Undoubtedly,  the  attractiveness  of  the  story  is  its  consistency  with 
both  the  observed  declines  in  the  relative  wages  of  low  skilled  workers  in  the  1980’s  and  the 
popular  vision  of  the  effects  of  computer-based  mechanization  in  the  workplace.  With  the 
rapid  diffusion  of  computer-based  production  technologies  and  an  increasingly  competitive 
environment,  the  old  regime  of  large,  integrated,  capital-intensive  plants  relying  on  low-skill 
manual  labor  is  being  transformed  into  a new  production  system  of  small,  flexible,  techno- 
logically  advanced  firms  that  depend  upon  an  elite  cadre  of  highly  educated  workers.  Unlike 
the  traditional  “Taylor&”  model,  in  the  new  “high  performance”  workplace  workers  must 
possess  the  cognitive  and  diagnostic  skills  necessary  to  perform  a broad  range  of  frequently 
changing  tasks.  So  the  upshot  is  that  computers  and  related  technologies  require  higher  skills 
and  workers  with  obsolete  or  insufficient  skills  inevitably  get  paid  less  and  ultimately  lose 
rising  joblessness  occurrs  as  wages  (skills)  decline,  it  is  then  natural  to  assume  that  it  is  a 
decline  in  the  demand  for  low-skill  labor  that  accounts  for  rising  joblessness.  But  if  we 
“unbundle”  the  skill  and  wage  distributions,  increasing  joblessness  might  be  seen  as  the  result 
of  falling  wage  levels  (which  may  reflect  management  practices,  government  policies,  or 
supply  side  developments)  with  no  necessary  role  for  changes  in  the  demand  for  skill. -  10 - 
their  jobs,  leaving  behind  a more  skilled  workforce. 
This  is  a plausible  story.  But  the  question  then  becomes:  did  changes  in  production 
technology  in  the  1980’s  radically  increase  the  skill  mix  of  the  workforce?  Put  differently, 
was  the  shift  away  from  low-skilled  work  so  much  greater  than  it  was  in  earlier  earlier 
decades  that  it  can  be  identified  as  the  primary  cause  of  the  unprecedented  two  decade  long 
plunge  in  both  the  relative  and  real  wages  of  low-skilled  workers? 
Although  the  rising  payoff  to  education  is  usually  attributed  to  the  increasing  demand  for 
skills  generated  by  the  use  of  new  technology  in  the  workplace,  few  statistical  studies  have 
actually  employed  either  direct  measures  of  new  technology  (as  opposed  to  assuming,  for 
example,  that  it  is  measured  by  the  residual  of  the  equation)  or  direct  measures  of  skill 
requirements  (in  contrast  to  educational  attainment  or  relative  wages).  Ed  Wolff  and  I 
attempted  to  fill  this  gap  by  developing  a number  of  measures  of  new  technology,  such  as  the 
value  of  computer  purchases  per  dollar  of  output,  the  share  of  new  investment  in  total  capital 
stock,  and  the  share  of  engineers  in  the  total  workforce,  to  help  explain  changes  in  skill 
requirements  among  industries.  We  measured  skills  with  both  indices  of  cognitive,  interactive 
and  motor  skill  job  requirements  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles  as  well  as  the 
shares  of  five  large  occupation  groups  in  total  employment  (Howell  and  Wolff,  1992). 
Our  results  indicated  that  new  production  technologies  have  indeed  tended  to  increase  the 
cognitive  skill  levels  of  the  workforce  since  1970,  with  the  strongest  and  most  reliable  effects 
occurring  in  the  goods  industries.  The  use  of  occupation  shares  as  measures  of  skill  levels 
produced  mixed  results:  the  deployment  of  new  technology  clearly  raised  the  demand  for 
professional  and  technical  workers  (high  cognitive  skill)  while  reducing  the  demand  for 
managers  (moderate-high  skill),  clerical  workers  (low-moderate  skill),  and  operatives  and 
laborers  (low  skill).  These  results  suggest  that  while  the  effects  of  new  production  technolo- 
gy  on  skills  varies  by  sector  and  occupation  group,  it is  fair  to  say  that,  overall  it  tends  to 
raise  the  demand  for  high  cognitive  skill  workers  and  reduce  the  demand  for  low-skill  work- 
ers.  But  the  questions  remain:  Was  the  impact  of  technological  change  on  the  mix  of  skills 
required  in  the  workplace  substantially  different  from  earlier  decades?  Was  the  impact  large 
enough  to  cause  the  unique  earnings  patterns  observed  over  the  last  decade?  Can  this  drop  in 
demand  explain  the  decline  in  wages  that  has  occurred  even  within  rapidly  expanding  low- -  11 - 
skill  service  occupations? 
From  the  vantage  point  of  the  entire  economy,  there  is no  doubt  that  there  has  been  a 
gradual  increase  in  the  demand  for  highly  skilled  workers.  As  the  late  eminent  economist 
Fritz  Machlup  pointed  out  in  the  early  1960’s,  the  increase  in  the  demand  for  information 
workers  - those  with  relatively  high  cognitive  skills  - dates  back  at  least  to  the  turn  of  the 
century.  While  this  was  caused  in  large  part  by  the  shift  away  from  agriculture  in  the  early 
decades  of  the  century,  the  same  trend  can  be  found  in  the  goods  industries  since  the  1940’s. 
Indeed,  the  share  of  semi-skilled  and  low-skilled  manual  workers  in  total  employment 
declined  substantially  in  each  decade  from  1950  to  1980  (Howell  and  Wolff,  1991 b).  Several 
recent  studies  using  economy-wide  data  on  occupation  and  industry  employment  trends  and 
direct  measures  of  skill  requirements  have  found  declining  rates  of  skill  growth  with  each 
decade  since  the  1960’s  (Howell  and  Wolff,  199 la;  Mishel  and  Teixera,  199 1). Using 
different  data  and  methods,  Murphy  and  Welch  (AER,  May  1993)  concluded  that  “we  do  not 
find  that  the  demand  for  skill  grew  particularly  rapidly  during  the  1970’s  and  1980’s,  a period 
when  wage  inequality  expanded  in  comparison  to  the  three  earlier  decades....”  Interestingly, 
the  same  Skill  Commission  whose  theme  was  the  necessity  of  choosing  between  high  skills  or 
low  wages  conducted  a  survey  of  employers  and  found  that  only  5 percent  of  the  firms  were 
actually  concerned  about  a skill  shortage.  This  is  consistent  with  a new  study  on  international 
competitiveness  by  McKinsey  which  concluded  that  it  was  not  primarily  skills  or  technology 
that  distinguishes  productivity  rates  among  nations,  but  rather  management  and  labor  relations 
policies  (cite). 
Computer-based  technologies  do  not  appear  to  have  had  a  significant  impact  on  national 
employment  patterns  until  the  mid  1980’s  and  their  diffusion  is  almost  certainly  taking  place 
at  an  increasing  rate  (see  Howell,  1993).  According  to  the  technology-induced  skill  mismatch 
story,  the  earnings  status  of  low-skilled  workers  should  have  been  getting  progressively  worse 
throughout  the  decade.  There  is  no  evidence  that  this  occurred.  This  raises  questions  about  the 
conclusion  reached  by  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches  (1993)  that  “production  labor-saving 
technological  change  is  the  most  likely  explanation  for  the  shift  in  demand  towards  non- 
production  workers....”  As  noted  above,  their  data  show  that  all  of  the  shift  took  place 
between  1980  and  1982.  Since  it  is  widely  recognized  that  there  is  some  lag  between  the purchase  of  new  technologies  and  their  effective  utilization,  their  technological  change 
explanation  suggests  a substantial,  but  one-time  restructuring  of  manufacturing  production 
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processes  in  the  late  1970’s.  This  seems  implausible.  Furthermore,  such  an  explanation 
suggests  a long-term  trend,  not  a three  year  “shock.”  4+- Case  studies  are  also  instructive. 
Shaiken  (1993)  describes  a relatively  new  and  technologically  advanced  Ford  assembly  and 
stamping  plant  in  Mexico.  This  plant  had  higher  quality  ratings  on  the  cars  it  produced  than 
five  of  eight  Japanese-owned  factories  in  the  United  States.  According  to  the  skill  mismatch 
account,  a high-tech,  high-performance  manufacturing  plant  such  as  this  should  rely  primarily 
on  highly  skilled  workers  - there  should  be  relatively  few  job  opportunities  for  low-skilled 
workers.  But  according  to  Shaiken  (p.  60)  “the  average  age  of  the  initial  workers  hired  was  in 
the  early  twenties.  All  lacked  auto  industry  experience.  Thirty  percent  had  a junior  high 
school  education  and  63  percent  had  completed  high  school  or  a technical  education.” 
Evidently,  high-tech,  high-performance  manufacturing  is  consistent  with  an  extremely  low- 
skill  and  inexperienced  workforce. 
On  the  other  hand,  perhaps  the  Mexican  Ford  plant  is not  representative.  In  his  study  of 
machine  shops  in  the  U.S.,  Jeffrey  Keefe  (199 1:5 15-16)  found  that  “the  diffusion  of  NC 
(numerical  controls)  has  had  no  significant  impact  on  overall  machine  shop  skill  levels.” 
Using  data  from  a large  compensation  consulting  firm,  Peter  Cappelli  (1993:528)  reports 
significant  skill  upgrading  for  most  production  occupations  between  1978  and  1986,  but 
consistent  with  Keefe’s  finding,  the  cause  did  not  appear  to  be  technological  change:  “Chang- 
es  in  production  jobs  seem  much  more  driven  by  developments  in  traditional  employee 
relations  arenas.  Particularly  influential  have  been  new  management  views  concerning  how 
jobs  should  be  redesigned.“’  Among  clerical  jobs,  however,  Cappelli  (p.524)  finds  that  half 
‘Cappelli  nevertheless  adopts  part  of  what  I have  called  the  conventional  view  - that 
upskilling  “must  represent  a shift  in  the  demand  for  skill”  since  “requirements  rose  even  as 
the  price  of  skills  was  rising.”  The  evidence  he  presents  for  a rising  price  of  skills  consists  of 
a regression  of  community-wide  skill  change  on  wage  change  for  production  workers.  The 
results  show  that  wage  growth  is  positively  associated  with  skill  change  for  the  25  communi- 
ties  he  tested.  Why  aggregate  community-level  data  are  the  appropriate  level  of  analysis  is  not 
explained.  Since  the  skill  change  results  are  presented  as representative  of  national  trends,  it 
seems  far  more  appropriate  to  compare  them  with  trends  in  real  production  worker  wages  in “experienced  significant  upskilling,  and  the  other  half  had  significant  deskilling”  and  con- 
eludes  that  new  office  technologies  appear  to  be  the  cause  of  the  deskilling.  Tilly  (1992)  also 
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refers  to  the  deskilling  of  cashiers  by  new  electronic  scanning  systems,  It  should  be  noted  that 
deskilling  should  have  the  effect  of  increasing  market  opportunities  for  those  with  the  least 
educational  attainment. 
In  a recent  case  study  of  changes  in  occupational  employment  in  the  commercial  banking 
industry,  Kuster  (1993:24-25)  concluded  that  despite  substantial  restructuring  as  a result  of 
deregulation  and  the  introduction  of  computer-based  technologies,  “commercial  banks  tended 
to  retain  their  traditional  occupational  staffing  patterns.”  In  fact,  despite  the  rapidly  growing 
use  of  automated  teller  machines  (ATM’s),  tellers  actually  increased  in  both  number  and 
share  of  total  industry  employment.  Again,  there  is  little  evidence  from  this  industry  that 
technological  change  dramatically  reduced  market  opportunities  for  low-skill  workers  in  the 
1980’s. 
While  examples  of  large-scale  technological  displacement  of  low-skill  workers  probably 
exist,  the  case  study  literature  suggests  that  technological  progress  in  the  late  1970’s  and 
1980’s  did  not  revolutionize  the  skill  distribution.  The  effects  on job  opportunities  and  skill 
levels  vary  by  company,  industry  and  occupation,  and  reflect  a continuation  of  long-term 
trends.  Neither  statistical  nor  case  study  evidence  indicates  that  there  has  been  the  sort  of 
massive  technological  restructuring  of  the  workplace  that  would  be  necessary  to  account  for 
the  wage  collapse  experienced  by  low-skill  workers  since  the  mid  1970’s. 
Indeed,  part  of  the  problem  for  low  skill  workers  in  the  1980’s  may  have  been  a  “reverse 
skill  mismatch.”  With  an  insu$?cient demand  for  highly  educated  workers,  many  college 
graduates  had  to  compete  for  relatively  low-skill  jobs,  which  had  the  effect  of  lowering  the 
wage  rates  of  already  low-wage  jobs.6  There  is  abundant  evidence  that  computer-based 
manufacturing.  These  fell  over  the  time  period  he  considers,  which  does  not  suggest  a shift  in 
demand. 
6 This  does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  the  evidence  that  the  return  to  college  education 
rose  sharply  in  the  1980’s.  While  growth  in  the  “redundant”  portion  of  the  college  educated 
labor  supply  will  tend  to  reduce  the  absolute  value  of  this  return,  increasing  earnings  by  the 
unaffected  (higher  skill)  part  of  the  college  educated  pool  could  more  than  offset  this  effect. -  14- 
technologies  and  corporate  restructuring  have  made  large  numbers  of  middle-level  managers 
redundant  (see  Howell  and  Wolff,  1992).  Kuster’s  (1993)  case  study  of  the  commercial 
banking  industry  found,  for  example,  that  between  1987  and  1990  there  was  a  13 percent 
decline  (from  45,000  to  39,000)  in  general  managers,  a decline  from  2.9  percent  to  2.5 
percent  of  total  industry  employment.  The  effect  of  this  restructuring  has  been  to  force  those 
with  training  for  white-collar  jobs  to  compete  for jobs  with  low  cognitive  skill  requirements. 
In  support  of  this  twist  in  the  skill  mismatch  story,  data  from  the  Panel  Study  of  Income 
Dynamics  (PSID)  show  that  in  the  late  1970’s  about  40  percent  of  the  sample  reported  them- 
selves  to  be  “over-educated”  for  their  jobs  (Sicherman,  1989).  According  to  recent  reports  by 
economists  from  the  U.S.  Labor  Department,  throughout  the  1980’s  about  20%  of  college 
graduates  were  working  at jobs  that  don’t  normally  require  a degree,  and  this  is  expected  to 
increase  to  30%  at  the  end  this  decade  (Hecker,  1992;  Shelley,  1992).  Declining  opportunities 
in  the  middle  of  the  job  ladder  might  be  expected  expected  to  have  the  greatest  negative 
impact  on  minority  workers.  In  fact,  the  share  of  black  and  Hispanic  college  graduates  with 
poverty-level  wages  rose  dramatically  in  this  decade,  from  about  9 percent  to just  under  15 
percent.  If  the  unemployed  and  those  who  had  stopped  looking  for  work  are  included,  the 
incidence  of  low  earnings  among  college  graduates  rose  from  14.6  percent  to  2 1.4%  for  black 
men  and  from  11 percent  to  19.4%  for  Hispanic  men  (Acs  and  Danziger,  1993). 
2.  Employment  Trends:  Are Opportunities  for Low-Skill  Work  Collapsing? 
A.  Low  Wage  and  Low  Skill  Shares  of  Employment,  1975-90 
According  to  the  skill  mismatch  story,  the  problem  facing  low  skilled  workers  in  the 
1980’s  was  that  worker  skills  simply  did  not  increase  to  meet  the  rising  skill  demands  of jobs. 
The  consequence  was  declining  demand,  low  earnings,  and  rising  unemployment  and  nonpar- 
ticipation.  This  story  assumes  a close  link  between  skills  and  wages.  If  fewer  and  fewer  jobs 
require  low  skills,  wages  should  fall  but  fewer  jobs  should  be  paying  low  wages  (the  presence 
Furthermore,  the  increasing  competition  for  lower  skill  jobs  by  the  redundant  college  educated 
workforce  will  also  tend  to  lower  the  wage  of  those  with  low  educational  attainment.  A  large 
part  of  the  growth  in  the  wage  gap  between  college  and  high  school  degree  holders  was  due 
to  the  decline  in  the  earnings  of  the  latter  (cite). -  15- 
of  too  many  low-skilled  workers  should  not  affect  the  wages  for  higher  skilled  jobs  since  they 
are  not  substitutes  for  higher  skilled  workers).  It  seems  reasonable  to  expect,  therefore,  that 
changes  in  the  share  of  low-wage  workers  should  roughly  correspond  to  changes  in  the  share 
of  low-skill  workers.  To  examine  this  proposition,  I  calculated  the  share  of  workers  earning 
low  wages  and  the  share  with  low  educational  attainment  for  1975  (the  earliest  year  for  which 
hourly  earnings  can  be  calculated  from  the  Current  Population  Survey),  1979,  1984  and 
1990.’  Low  wages  are  defined  as  1.5  times  the  poverty  level  for  an  urban  family  of  three. 
Assuming  1750  hours  of  work  (50  weeks,  35  hours),  this  “low-wage”  threshold  was  an  hourly 
wage  of  $8.09  in  1988.  Low  skills  were  defined  as  educational  attainment  that  does  not  go 
beyond  high  school.  This  is  by  no  means  an  adequate  measure  of  the  skills  required  in  the 
workplace  (see  Howell  and  Wolff,  199la),  but  it does  offer  a convenient  and  familiar  measure 
of  cognitive  skills.  Since  the  purpose  was  to  provide  insight  into  current  labor  market  condi- 
tions  and  to  reduce  the  effect  that  older,  less-educated  workers  might  have  on  the  results,  only 
those  in  the  first  half  of  their  careers  (ages  16-39)  were  included  in  the  analysis. 
Figure  3  shows  that  employed  workers  with  low  educational  attainment  declined  through- 
out  the  15 year  period,  from  62.8%  in  1975  to  55.5%  in  1990.  Although  the  technological 
change  explanation  would  suggest  that  the  greatest  increase  should  have  taken  place  in  the 
second  half  of  the  1980’s  when  the  demand  for  skills  presumably  accelerated  and  those 
without  adequate  skills  dropped  out  of  the  labor  market,  the  data  indicate  that  this  increase 
actually  took  place  in  the  early  1980’s.  In  sharp  contrast,  Figure  3  also  shows  that  low  wage 
workers  increased  from  50.6%  to  55.8%  of  the  workforce  from  1975  to  1990,  with  the  largest 
jump  again  occurring  in  the  1979-84  period. 
Figures  4  and  5 distinguish  these  trends  for  the  goods  and  service  industries.  These  show 
that  a declining  share  of  low-skill  workers  and  a rising  share  of  low-wage  workers  character- 
ize  both  industry  groups.  But  there  are  two  interesting  differences.  First,  the  pace  of  the 
restructuring  - the  percentage  change  from  1975-90  - was  much  more  rapid  in  the  goods  than 
the  service  sector,  both  with  respect  to  skills  and  earnings.  Second,  compared  to  the  service 
‘TWO of  these  years,  1975  and  1990,  are  recession  years.  Replacing  these  with  1976  and 
1989  has  no  effect  on  the  trends  presented  below. -  16- 
industries,  employment  in  the  goods  industries  is  characterized  by  far  lower  shares  of  low- 
wage  workers  in  each  of  the  four  years  (3744%  vs.  59-62%)  and  much  higher  shares  of  low- 
skill  workers  (73-64%  vs.  56-51%). 
At  the  industry  level,  the  growth  in  low  wage  employment  was  the  most  pronounced  in 
the  goods  industries.  Of  the  10 industries  with  greater  than  20%  increases  in  the  low-wage 
share  of  total  employment,  9 were  goods  producing.  Also  worth  noting  is  that  among 
industries  with  substantial  declines  in  the  low  skill  share  of  employment,  many  had  large 
increases  in  low  wage  shares.  For  example,  between  1975  and  1990  restructuring  in  the  Stone, 
Clay,  Glass  and  Primary  Metals  industry  (which  includes  steel)  resulted  in  a 9%  decline  in 
the  share  of  low  skill  employment  (from  77%  to  70%)  but  a  76%  increase  in  the  low-wage 
share  (from  23%  to  40%).  The  communications  industry  saw  its  low-skill  share  decline  by 
33%  (from  58%  to  39%)  and  its  low-wage  share  increase  by  33%  (from  22  to  29%).  Even 
more  dramatically,  the  automobile  industry’s  low  skill  employment  share  declined  by  6% 
(from  76%  to  71%)  but  its  low  wage  share  grew  by  142%  (from  17%  to  40%).’  Industries 
with  high-wage,  low-skill  workforces  radically  restructured  their  workplaces  in  the  1980’s  by 
lowering  wages  and  raising  skill  requirements  - in  short,  moving  in  the  direction  of  the 
typical  service  sector  workplace.  The  mismatch appears  to be  less one  between skills 
demanded  and  skills supplied  than between &ills demanded  and  wages paid. 
The  elimination  of  living-wage,  low  cognitive  skill  jobs  has  produced  an  extraordinarily 
rapid  convergence  of  low-wage  and  low-skill  employment  shares  among  industries  since 
1979.  Interestingly  (at  least  for  economists),  in  this  respect  the  recent  restructuring  has  made 
the  labor  market  more  like  that  described  in  the  textbook  model.  The  correlation  between 
low-wage  and  low-  skill  shares  of  employment  was  insignificant  in  1979  (.057)  but  rose  to 
.255  in  1984  and  .337  in  1990.  As  will  be  seen  in  the  next  section,  a key  avenue  through 
which  this  convergence  was  achieved  was  by  reducing  the  share  of  low  skill  workers  with 
relatively  high  earnings. 
‘These  results  are  conservative  since  temporary  workers,  whose  share  of  employment 
greatly  expanded  in  the  1980’s,  are  defined  as  service  sector  workers  and  are  not  included 
the  data. 
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Finally,  Figure  6 reports  another  notable  effect  of  1980’s  restructuring:  the  growth  of  that 
part  of  the  workforce  with  relatively  high  educational  attainment  but  earning  very  low  wages, 
Workers  paid  less  than  1.5  times  the  poverty-level  wage  with  more  than  a high  school 
education  grew  from  6.8  to  12 million  workers  between  1975  and  1990.  This  amounted  to  an 
increase  in  the  low-wage/high-skill  share  of  employment  from  14.1  to  18.5  percent.  Again, 
most  of  the  change  was  accounted  for  by  the  1979-84  period,  in  which  three-quarters  of  the 
change  occurred. 
B.  The  Job  Quality  Structure 
Another  way  to  look  at  employment  restructuring  is  by  examining  changes  in  the 
structure  of jobs  with  a classification  scheme  that  groups  jobs  on  the  basis  of  similarities  in 
job  quality.  The  most  commonly  used  schemes  use  either  industrial  sectors  (e.g.,  manufactur- 
ing,  construction,  and  financial  services)  or  occupational  groups  (e.g.,  professionals,  manag- 
ers,  and  operatives).  But  if  the  concern  is  with  the  effects  of  restructuring  on  the  quality  mix 
of jobs  - on  the  relative  numbers  of  “good”  and  “bad” jobs  - we  need  an  approach  that 
incorporates  both  industry  and  occupation  dimensions.  That  is  because,  first,  there  are  vast 
differences  in  the  quality  of jobs  in  each  industry,  no  matter  how  detailed  its  definition.  And 
second,  occupation  groups  include  very  different  kinds  of jobs  depending  upon  the  industry  of 
employment.  For  example,  compare  the  earnings  of  a legal  secretary  with  a  secretary 
employed  in,  say,  a private  university.  Or  compare  the  pay  of  a truck  driver  for  a local 
furniture  store  with  a driver  for  the  U.S.  Postal  Service. 
A  better  approach  is  to  define  jobs  by  both  occupation  and  industry,  and  then  to  group 
these  occupation-industry  cells  into  a small  number  of  categories  based  on  a number  of 
accepted  indicators  of job  quality.  This  would  offer  the  advantages  of  both  simplicity  (a  small 
number  of job  groups)  and  usefulness  (job  groups  that  are  relatively  similar  in  terms  of 
quality).  Using  a statistical  technique  called  cluster  analysis,  Maury  Gittleman  and  I  have 
done  this  (Gittleman  and  Howell,  1993).  We  grouped  621 jobs  (94%  of  the  nonagricultural workforce)  on  the  basis  of  17 measures  of job  quality’  and  found  that  the  structure  of  jobs 
could  be  characterized  in  three  tiers,  or  “segments,”  each  with  two  component  “contours.” 
-  18 - 
1979.  Each  of  these  job  contours  employed  between  11 and  21  percent  of  total  employment  in 
The  Independent  Primary  segment  consists  of  two  subsets  of jobs  distinguished 
primarily  by  whether  the  employer  is the  public  sector.  The  Private Independent  Primaly  (I- 
P)  contour  is  characterized  by  high  earnings,  high  shares  of  workers  with  health  and  pension 
benefits,  high  cognitive  skill  levels,  and  full-time  private  sector  jobs.  These  are  almost  exclu- 
sively  professional,  managerial,  and  high-wage  sales  jobs.  Jobs  in  the  Public  I-P  contour  were 
similar  in  most  respects,  but  workers  in  these  jobs  were  employed  almost  exclusively  in  the 
public  sector.  Examples  are  teachers,  police,  firefighters,  postal  workers,  and  public  sector 
managers  and  administrators. 
The  Subordinate  Primary  segment  also  consists  of  two  contours,  the  Routine  White- 
Collar  and  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar.  The  white-collar  job  group  pays  moderate  wages, 
requires  moderate  cognitive  skill  levels  but  demands  very  low  strength  and  other  physical 
demands.  Most  of  the  workforce  is  female.  Examples  of  these  jobs  are  nurses,  health 
technicians,  and  full-time  clerical  workers.  The  High-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour  is  made  up 
moderate/high  wage,  low  cognitive  skill  jobs  in  which  high  shares  of  workers  have  health  and 
pension  benefits,  are  unionized,  and  do  tasks  requiring  substantial  strength  and  other  physical 
demands  (e.g.,  truck  drivers,  assemblers,  and  machine  operatives  in  high-wage  industries). 
The  Secondary  segment  includes  the  Low-Wage  Blue-Collar  and  Contingent  contours. 
Compared  to  the  High- Huge Blue  Collar contour,  workers  in  Low-  Huge Blue-Collar  jobs 
earn  much  less,  are  less  likely  to  be  union  members  or  to  have  employer  paid  health  and 
pension  benefits,  require  lower  cognitive  skills,  and  work  at  tasks  requiring  higher  strength 
and  other  physical  demands.  Typical  of  these  jobs  are  machine  operatives  and  laborers  in 
various  low-wage  industries,  carpenters  and  painters  in  construction,  and  cooks  and  miscella- 
neous  food  occupations  in  retail  trade.  The  Contingent  contour  consists  of jobs  that  pay 
poverty-level  wages,  are  the  least  likely  to  provide  health  and  pension  benefits,  and  have  the 
‘Demographic  characteristics  like  gender,  race,  age,  and  marital  status  were  not  employed 
in  the  cluster  analysis. -  19- 
highest  shares  of  workers  employed  part-time  and  part-year.  At  the  same  time,  average 
educational  levels  are  substantially  higher  than  in  the  two  blue-collar  contours.  Examples  are 
cashiers  and  sales  occupations  in  retail  trade,  child  care  workers  and  household  workers. 
These  six  contours  were  defined  using  data  for  1979  (primarily  from  the  1980  Census). 
Earnings  ranged  from  $17,400  in  the  Private I-P  contour,  where  86  percent  worked  full-time, 
to  $4,700  in  the  Contingent contour,  where  only  37  percent  were  full-time.  Despite  educa- 
tional  attainment  that  was  almost  a year  and  a half  greater  (12.8  compared  to  11.4),  the 
average  hourly  wage  in  the  Routine  WSite-Collar contour  was  just  70  percent  of  the  High- 
Wage Blue-Collar  wage  ($5.24,  compared  to  $7.44).  Not  surprisingly,  75%  of  Routine  W’hite- 
Collar job  holders  were  female,  compared  to just  15%  of  High- Wage Blue-Collar  employees. 
Both  unionization  and  health  insurance  coverage  were  also  highest  in  the  High-Wage  Blue- 
Collar  contour. 
C.  Employment  Restructuring  in  the  1980’s 
Using  this  classification  scheme,  we  find  a dramatic  restructuring  of  employment  since 
1973,  with  most  of  the  change  concentrated  in  the  1979-83  period.  Figure  7  shows  that  the 
subordinate  primary  segment  declined  by  4 percentage  points  between  1979  and  1990  (almost 
all  of  which  was  accounted  for  by  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour),  while  the  indepen- 
dent  primary  segment  has  grown  rapidly  since  1973,  rising  from  about  25  to  32  percent  of  the 
workforce  (accounted  for  almost  entirely  by  the  Private I-P  contour).  In  contrast  employment 
in  the  secondary  segment  has  remained  virtually  unchanged  between  1979  and  1990.  In  fact, 
unlike  the  1979-83  period,  there  was  virtually  no  change  in  employment  shares  between  1987 
and  1990.  Since  the  transformation  to  “high  performance”  workplaces  was  presumably  more 
prevalent  in  the  later  period,  the  timing  of  these  changes  lends  little  support  to  the  skill  mis- 
match  thesis  that  technological  advances  have  led  to  a drop  in  low-skill  job  opportunities  on  a 
scale  large  enough  to  cause  a major  restructuring  of  the  wage  distribution. 
While  secondary  jobs  have  hardly  declined  as  a share  of  total  employment  in  the  last 
decade,  they  did  fail  sharply  in  quality  - as did jobs  in  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour. 
Real  hourly  earnings  in  the  Contingent,  Low-Wage Blue-Collar  and  High-Wage  Blue-Collar - 20  - 
contours  all  dropped  substantially  (IO-13%)  between  1979  and  1990.  Real  earnings  increased 
slightly  in  the  Routine  White-Collar  contour  and  remained  about  the  same  in  the  two  indepen- 
dent  primary  contours. 
Declines  in  quality  can  be  seen  in  other  indicators  as  well.  The  share  of  workers  with 
employer  provided  health  insurance  fell  in  all  six  contours,  but  the  greatest  declines  were  in 
the  blue-collar  and  contingent  contours:  coverage  in  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour  fell 
from  83.6%  to  72.8%,  while  coverage  declined  from  56%  to  42%  in  the  Low-Wage  Blue- 
Collar  contour  and  from  33%  to  25%  in  the  Contingent  contour.  At  the  same  time,  involun- 
tary  part-time  employment,  the  share  of  workers  who  work  part-time  but  want  full-time  jobs, 
increased  in  these  three  low-skill  contours  (respectively,  from  2.5  to  2.9%,  4.9  to  7.5%,  and 
4.5  to  9.6%)  but  remained  essentially  unchanged  in  the  other  three. 
Who  was  hurt  most  by  these  trends?  On  the  basis  of  earnings,  health  insurance  coverage 
and  involuntary  part-time  employment,  the  greatest  declines  in job  quality  in  the  1980’s  took 
place  in  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar,  Low-Wage  Blue-Collar,  and  Contingent  contours. 
Compared  to  half  of  all  white  male  workers,  73%  of  all  black  male  workers  and  75%  of 
Hispanic  male  workers  were  employed  in  these  three  contours  in  1990.  These  contours  also 
employed  58  percent  of  all  black  female  workers  and  62  percent  of  all  Hispanic  female 
workers,  compared  to  under  42%  of  all  white  female  employees. 
These  results  clearly  indicate  that  the  employment  restructuring  that  took  place  in  the 
1980’s  had  two  main  features.  First,  as  Bluestone  and  Harrison  (1986)  and  others  argued  in 
the  early  1980’s,  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in  the  middle  of  the  job  structure  for  men.  And 
second,  the  quality  of  subordinate  primary  and  secondary  jobs  fell  in  both  absolute  and 
relative  terms  throughout  this  decade.  Both  of  these  developments  underlie  the  growth  of 
earnings  inequality  documented  by  Levy  and  Mumane  (1992):  compared  to  1979,  in  1987 
larger  shares  of  male  workers  were  earning  less  than  $20,000  and  more  than  $40,000,  but  a 
far  smaller  share  earned  between  $20,000  and  $40,000. 
D.  Projected  Trends  in  the  1990’s 
Are  the  1990’s  likely  to  show  similar  trends?  To  answer  this  question  I turned  to -2l- 
employment  projections  made  by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Labor’s  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics. 
The  standard  source  for  these  projections,  the  Bureau  makes  use  of  a large  statistical  model 
that  includes  the  results  of  numerous  case  studies  of  specific  occupations  and  industries  to 
estimate  future  employment  trends  by  occupation  (U..S.  Department  of  Labor,  1990). 
Although  these  projections  have  tended  to  be  conservative  since  they  rely  heavily  on  the 
extrapolation  of  past  trends,  they  offer  the  best  available  comprehensive  estimates  of  the  kinds 
of  changes  in  the  mix  of jobs  we  can  expect  in  the  future. 
Tables  1 and  2 present  average  educational  attainment,  earnings  and  the  female  share  of 
employment  for  large  occupations  projected  to  either  grow  rapidly  or  decline  in  number  by 
the  year  2000.  The  first  column  of  Table  1 shows  that  rapidly  expanding  occupations  are  by 
no  means  limited  to  those  with  high  educational  attainment:  7 of  the  18 occupations  have 
average  education  levels  below  the  economy-wide  workforce  average  (13.1  years).  And  as 
the  third  column  indicates,  all  seven  had  average  annual  earnings  that  were  less  than  $10,000 
(the  poverty  line  for  an  urban  family  of  three  was  $9,436).  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the 
female  share  of  employment  was  high  in  all  seven.  Indeed,  in  four  of  these  large,  rapidly 
growing  occupations,  the  female  share  ranged  from  82  to  96  percent.  These  results  suggest  a 
bright  future  for  many  low-skill,  low-wage,  traditionally  female  occupations. 
Table  2  indicates  that  all  of  the  largest  occupations  expected  to  show  absolute  declines  in 
employment  require  relatively  low  educational  attainment.  But  the  Table  also  shows  that  4  of 
the  the  10 declining  occupations  had  average  earnings  that  ranged  from  $15,082  -  $20,908. 
Three  of  these  were  predominantly  male  occupations  (Metal  Working  Machine  Operators, 
Welders  and  Cutters,  and  Industrial  Equipment  Operators). 
These  results  were  limited  to  large  occupations  that  are  projected  to  grow  and  decline  the 
most.  What  happens  when  all jobs  are  taken  into  account  ?  Since  the  BLS  projections  are  not 
available  for  the  occupation-industry  cells  we  used  to  generate  our  contours,  I  could  not 
project  employment  growth  by  contour.  As  an  alternative,  I grouped  the  227  occupations” 
that  were  both  appear  in  the  BLS  projections  and  match  those  in  the  Current  Population 
Survey  into  another  six-category  scheme  that  distinguishes  poverty,  low,  moderate  and  high- 
‘These  cover  about  92  percent  of  total  employment. - 22  - 
wage  occupations,  and  subdivides  the  low  and  moderate-wage  groups  by  education  level  (for 
the  earnings  and  educational  attainment  criteria  used  for  defining  these  groups,  see  the 
footnote  to  Table  3). 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  3  which  reports  that  the  two  highest  wage,  highest  skill 
occupation  groups  (5  and  6),  accounted  for  slightly  more  than  one-third  of  total  employment 
in  1988  and  are  predicted  to  grow  the  most  rapidly  (21%  and  24%).  Workers  in  these  jobs 
had  educational  attainment  levels  that  were  two  years  greater  than  average.  The  Table  also 
reports,  however,  that  the  average  earnings  of  three of  the  six  wage-education  groups  were 
near  to  or  below  the  poverty  wage  (less  than  1.5 times  the  poverty  line  for  a family  of  three). 
These  83  occupations  also  accounted  for  more  than  a  third  (36.4%)  of  all  employment  in 
1988.  According  to  the  BLS  projections,  employment  growth  in  two  of  these  three  groups  - 
the  Poverty  Wage and  the  Low-Wage High-Education  groups  (just  under  30%  of  total 
employment)  - will  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  economy-wide  average  of  17.4%.  The 
second  occupation  group,  Low- Wage Low-Education,  is  projected  to  have  by  far  the  slowest 
growth  in  employment  (8.8  percent),  but  these  occupations  consist  of just  7 percent  of  total 
employment. 
While  Poverty-Wage  and  Low- Wage High Education  occupations  are  expected  to  grow  at 
about  average  rates  and  the  two  high  education  job  groups  will  expand  at rates  4-7  percentage 
points  above  average,  the  63  occupations  that  pay  living  wages  but  require  relatively  low 
educational  levels  and  comprise  28%  of  the  workforce  are  projected  to  grow  by  just  13.1%, 
4.3  points  below  average.  Although  these  differences  will  change  the  distribution  of 
employment  among  the  six  groups  only  marginally,  they  do  indicate  that  the  labor  market  can 
be  expected  to  continue  to  exhibit  a  “declining  middle.”  The  central  message  from  these 
employment  projections  is,  as  the  evidence  from  the  1980’s  also  showed,  that  the  skill 
distribution  does  not  appear  to  be  undergoing  a radical  shift  as  a result  of  employment 
restructuring  among  occupations.  The  three  occupation  groups  in  which  workers  had  average 
educational  attainment  levels  below  that  of  a high  school  degree  (12  years)  consisted  of  about 
52  %  of  all  workers  in  1988;  BLS  projections  suggest  that  these  jobs  will  still  employ  close 
to  half  of  all  workers  in  the  year  2000. - 23  - 
3. Concluding  Remarks:  An  “Institutionalist”  Story 
An  enormous  research  effort  has  been  made  to  try  to  understand  the  severe  deterioration 
in  the  earnings  status  of  low-skilled  workers  in  the  1980’s.  Surveying  this  literature,  Levy  and 
Mumane  (1992)  concluded  that  we  do  not  yet  have  the  data  to  provide  an  entirely  satisfactory 
answer.  But  we  do  know  that  it  was  primarily  changes  in  wage  rates  within  industry  and 
education  groups  that  led  to  the  rise  in  inequality  and  that  the  greatest  declines  in  wages  took 
place  among  those  with  the  least  educational  attainment  - although  as noted  above,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  incidence  of  low  earnings  grew  substantially  among  black  and 
Hispanic  male  college  graduates  as  well.  Despite  the  continuing  popularity  of  the  technology- 
induced  skill  mismatch  explanation  for  the  rising  incidence  of  low  earnings,  the  evidence 
presented  in  Sections  1 and  2  strongly  supports  Levy  and  Mumane’s  conclusion  that  there  is 
little  solid  empirical  support  for  it. 
So  why  did  the  share  of  low-wage  jobs  expand?  Part  of  the  answer  is  that  many  of  these 
jobs  have  traditionally  been  located  in  the  services  and  employment  in  many  of  these 
industries  expanded  in  the  1980’s.  But  like  the  decline  in  the  demand  for  low-skill  manual 
workers,  the  expansion  of  service  sector  employment  was  not  unique  to  the  last  decade. 
More  importantly,  an  “institutionalist”  explanation  for  the  declining  relative  earnings  of  low- 
skill  workers  would  focus  on  the  adoption  of  new  human  resource  policies  by  private  sector 
firms  faced  with  increasingly  competitive  product  markets,  an  increasing  supply  of  workers 
competing  for  a low-skill  jobs,  and  strongly  pro-business  Federal,  State  and  Local 
governments. 
In  developing  a competitive  strategy,  it  should  be  recognized  that  firms  are  not  limited  to 
a  choice  between  a low-skill,  low-wage  and  a high-skill,  high-wage  workplace  - the  so-called 
“low-road”  and  “high-road”  approaches.  Rather,  the  ideal  outcome  is  a highly  skilled,  reliable 
workforce  willing  to  accept  low  wages.  This  is particularly  important  in  a period  in  which 
markets  are  less  protected  than  ever  (so  labor  costs  are  crucial)  and  the  production  process 
requires  more  flexibility  to  adapt  products  to  consumer  demands  and  relies  more  heavily  on 
computer-based  technologies  (tending  to  require  higher  literacy). 
To  implement  a high-skill/low-wage  human  resource  strategy,  large  integrated  (high 
wage)  firms  have  downsized,  relying  more  heavily  on  low-wage  suppliers.  Advances  in - 24  - 
telecommunications  and  transportation  have  also  facilitated  relocation  of  lower-skilled 
operations  to  low-wage  sites,  leaving  behind  a core  of  permanent,  relatively  skilled  employees 
supplemented  (often  heavily)  by  part-time  and  temporary  workers.  Central  to  this  part  of  the 
strategy  has  been  an  uncompromising  attack  on  the  ‘middle”  - typically  those  blue-collar 
workers  with  relatively  low  cognitive  skills  taking  home  middle-class  paychecks.  A  good 
example  is  the  demand  for  large  wage  concessions  by  unionized  meatpacking  firms  in  the 
midwest  in  the  late  1980’s  - a demand  that  was  not  linked  to  changes  in  skill  requirements. 
According  to  spokespersons  of  Pratt  and  Whitney,  the  firm’s  decision  to  relocate  as  many  as 
9,000  high  paying  production  jobs  from  a high  skill  state  (Connecticut)  to  lower  skill  states 
(Maine  and  Georgia)  was  to  reduce  labor  costs.  Again,  lower  wages  result,  but  not  as  a 
response  to  new  workplace  technologies  (New  York  Times,  April  15,  1993:  p.  Al).  Another 
recent  New  York  Times  report  (July  18,  1993,  p.1)  documents  the  substantial  demand  for 
extremely  low-skilled  labor  in  the  1980’s  in  Saipan  and  other  U.S.  owned  islands  in  the  South 
Pacific  where  some  20,000  workers,  recruited  primarily  from  mainland  China,  typically  put  in 
six  days  a week  for  half  the  minimum  wage  making  American  brand-name  clothes.  As  this 
demand  for  low-skilled  workers  willing  to  accept  poverty-level  wages  expanded  in  these 
offshore  U.S  territories  in  the  198Os, low-skill  but  living-wage  garment  jobs  decreased  in  the 
continental  United  States. 
The  consequence,  as  Bennett  Harrison  (1993)  has  described  it,  is  that  the  job  structure  is 
being  transformed  from  one  with  a diamond  shape,  with  lots  of  good,  relatively  low-skilled 
jobs,  to  one  with  an  hourglass  shape,  in  which  only  the  best  and  worst  jobs  are  expanding. 
Levy  and  Murnane’s  survey  confirms  this  conclusion.  In  their  words,  “the  male  earnings 
distribution  has  ‘hollowed  out,’  leaving  larger  percentages  of  workers  at  the  top  and  bottom 
of  the  distribution,  and  a  smaller  percentage  in  the  middle”  (1992:  137 1). The  restructuring  of 
the  1980’s  was  much  less  about  an  across-the-board  decline  in  the  demand  for  low  cognitive 
skill  workers  than  about  a declining  demand  for  blue-collar  workers  earning  living  wages. 
This  evidence  suggests  that  low  ‘labor cost  employer  strategies,  not  declining  demand  due 
to  the  rapid  diffusion  of  new  technology,  is  the  main  source  of  the  rising  incidence  of  low 
earnings.  In  addition,  there  is  no  obvious  reason  why  a declining  demand  for  low-skill 
workers,  even  if  it  could  be  shown  to  be  substantially  greater  than  in  previous  decades,  would - 25  - 
explain  the  growth  of  within-group  (defined  by  industry,  gender,  education  and  experience 
level)  inequality.  To  explain  both  the  expansion  of  the  share  of  poverty-wage  workers  and  the 
rise  in  within-group  inequality  it  is  essential  to  recognize  the  central  role  of  corporate  human 
resource  strategies.  The  inequality  puzzle  seems  the  most  difficult;  the  answer  may  lie  in  the 
breakdown  of  “wage  norms”  within  firms  (as  internal  labor  markets  are  opened  up  to  external 
competition),  within  industies  (as  increasing  competition  causes  differences  among  firms  to 
become  a more  critical  factor  in  wage  outcomes)  and  among  communities  (as  transportation 
and  telecommunications  facilitate  the  relocation  of  some,  but  not  all,  firms  to  lower  wage 
areas).  In  short,  the  “law  of  one  price”  may  have  been  undermined,  not  promoted,  by  the 
recent  wage  restructuring.  In  any  case,  it  seems  wise  to  heed  the  words  of  Levy  and  Mumane 
(1992:  1374)  who  conclude  their  survey  of  recent  earnings  research  with  the  observation  that 
“The  decisions  firms  make  are  difficult  to  understand,  but  they  will  play  a large  role  in 
determining  the  distribution  of  earned  income  in  the  years  ahead.” 
Part  of  the  decline  in  bargaining  power  that  contributed  to  the  wage  collapse  can  be  traced 
to  the  supply  side.  As  the  middle  of  the  earnings  structure  narrowed,  low-skill  workers  have 
crowded  into  a pool  of  “secondary”  jobs  that  remained  a fairly  constant  share  of  total  jobs 
throughout  the  1980’s.  This  crowding  has  almost  certainly  tended  to  lower  the  wages  of  what 
were  already  the  worst  jobs  in  the  labor  market.  According  to  a recent  Department  of  Labor 
study  (Herz,  1991),  more  than  4.3  million  workers  were  displaced  during  the  boom  years  of 
1985-89.”  Only  72  percent  had  been  re-employed  by  January  1990  and  of  these,  about  10 
percent  worked  part-time.  Among  those  re-employed  full-time,  about  40  percent  earned  less  in 
current  dollars  than  on  their  previous  job.  Not  surprisingly,  those  least  successful  in  the  labor 
market  after  displacement  were  high-wage  blue-collar  men.  According  to  Herz  (1991:7)  “Six 
of  every  10 displaced  workers  in  this  industry  (transportation  equipment)  earned  less  on  their 
new  jobs  than  on  their  old  one,  and  more  than  half  of  this  group  suffered  declines  of  20 
percent  or  more.” 
The  downward  effect  of  a  “declining  middle”  on  the  wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  wage 
”  The  study  defines  displacement  as  “job  loss  due  to  plant  closings  or  moves,  slack  work, 
or  the  abolishment  of  their  positions  or  shifts.” - 26  - 
distribution  can  also  be  inferred  from  research  by  Robert  Topel  (1993:  113).  Between  1979 
and  1988,  he  finds  that  “nearly  one-third  of  the  unemployed  had  predisplacement  wages 
above  the  60th  percentile,  and  only  14 percent  are  from  the  bottom  decile....  Among  displaced 
workers  with  prior  earnings  from  the  upper  four  deciles,  current  wages  are  about  half  of  their 
predisplacement  level.”  Defining  the  unskilled  as those  with  low  wages,  Topel  (p.  110) 
interprets  his  results  as  showing  that  “Many  of  the  ‘unskilled’  who  are  unemployed  or  out  of 
the  labor  force  appear  to  have  been  high-wage  workers  whose  specialized  skills  have  become 
obsolete.”  High-wage  blue-collar  workers  were  certainly  hard  hit  by  the  1980’s,  but  there  is 
no  evidence  that  these  were  workers  with  specialized  skills  or  that  their  skills  become 
obsolete  at  a rate  that  was  substantially  greater  than  in  earlier  decades. 
Immigration  patterns  compounded  the  downward  effect  that  displaced  high-wage  workers 
had  on  the  wage  rates  of  low  cognitive  skill  jobs.  There  was  an  unprecedented  increase  in  the 
flow  of  low  skill  foreign  workers  into  the  U.S.  in  the  1980’s,  both  legal  and  illegal. 
According  to  Borjas,  Freeman  and  Katz  (1992:214-15)  the  combination  of  rising  imports  and 
growing  numbers  of  low-skilled  foreign  workers  had  substantial  negative  effects  on  the 
relative  earnings  of  native  low-skilled  workers.  The  authors  concluded  that  “We  estimate  that 
between  30%  and  50%  of  the  .  .  . decline  in  the  relative  weekly  wage  of  high  school  dropouts 
from  1980  to  1988  can  be  attributed  to  trade  and  immigration  flows.”  Case  study  evidence 
supports  this  finding.  In  his  study  of  the  Los  Angeles  restaurant  and  hotel  industry,  Waldinger 
(1992)  concluded  that  “the  story  of  black  displacement  in  restaurants  and  hotels  can  be  traced 
not  to  skill  upgrading,  but  rather  to  competition  with  a rapidly  growing  immigrant 
population.”  Similarly,  a General  Accounting  Office  study  cited  by  Jack  Miles  (Atlantic, 
October  1992)  found  that  “Janitorial  firms  serving  downtown  Low  Angeles  have  almost 
entirely  replaced  their  unionized  black  workforce  with  non-unionized  immigrants.”  Again,  it 
appears  to  have  been  labor  costs,  not  skill  restructuring,  that  explains  this  result. 
Government  policies  since  the  mid  1970’s  have  also  greatly  facilitated  the  adoption  of 
low-wage  human  resource  strategies  by  the  private  sector  - through  deregulation  of  the 
transportation  and  communication  industries,  hostility  towards  labor  unions,  a minimum  wage 
that  increased  from  $2.90  in  1979  to just  $3.35  in  1989,  and  an  evident  lack  of  interest  (quite 
unlike  our  major  competitors)  in  either  regulating  layoff  and  relocation  decisions  of  large - 27  - 
establishments  or  in  limiting  the  entry  of  low-skilled  foreign  workers.  To  cite  just  one 
example,  consider  the  effect  of  the  federal  government’s  foreign  trade  policies  on  the  relative 
bargaining  power  of  workers.  According  to  Shaiken  (1993:63),  a recent  Wall  Street  Journal 
poll  found  that  “one-quarter  of  almost  500  corporate  executives  polled  admitted  that  they  are 
either  ‘very  likely’  or  ‘somewhat  likely’  to  use  NAFTA  as  a bargaining  chip  to  hold  down 
wages.  About  40  percent  indicated  that  they  might  move  at  least  some  production  to  Mexico 
within  the  next  several  years.”  It  seems  likely  that  this  response  by  employers  had  little  to  do 
with  the  widely  heralded  (by  economists)  rise  in  the  demand  for  skill,  but  a lot  to  do  with 
wage  rates  - and  is  the  kind  of  response  that  can  help  explain  the  dramatic  rise  in  the  share  of 
workers  with  poverty-level  earnings.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  state  governments  have  also 
helped  facilitate  a low-wage  strategy;  in  their  increasingly  desperate  pursuit  of  manufacturing 
jobs,  state  and  local  government  officials  have  had  a  strong  incentive  to  pursue  policies  that 
keep  wages  “competitive”  and  union  membership  low. 
The  central  role  played  by  labor  market  institutions,  specifically  the  real  value  of  the 
minimum  wage  and  unionization,  is underlined  by  the  recent  comparative  study  of  wage 
inequality  trends  in  Canada  and  the  U.S.  in  the  1980’s  by  DiNardo  and  Lemieux.  Despite 
similar  labor  markets,  wage  inequality  grew  rapidly  in  the  U.S.  but  not  in  Canada.  Dinardo 
and  Lemieux  find  that  “during  this  period,  union  density  fell  precipitously  in  the  United  States 
but  declined  very  little  in  Canada.  Similarly,  the  real  minimum  wage  declined  by  23  percent 
in  the  United  States  but  by  only  12 percent  in  Canada...we  find  that  unions  and  the  minimum 
wage  accounted  for  80  percent  of  the  difference  in  the  growth  of  inequality  in  the  two 
countries.”  Confirming  Katz,  Loveman  and  Blanchflower’s  (1993)  conclusion  that  unions  and 
the  minimum  wage  helped  explain  the  different  experiences  of  France  (low  inequality  growth) 
and  Great  Britain  (increasing  wage  inequality)  during  this  period,  the  authors  conclude  that 
their  findings  underline  “the  enormous,  though  neglected,  role  of  labor  market  institutions  in 
explaining  the  very  different  changes  in  wage  inequality  across  countries.” 
Another  important,  but  neglected,  area  of  research,  concerns  the  impact  of  government 
social  policy  on  the  wage  distribution.  The  U.S.  continues  to  rely  heavily  on  employers  to 
provide  health  insurance,  pensions,  child  care,  and  other  fundamental  benefits  - benefits  that 
appear  as  labor  costs  to  employers.  These  costs  are  assumed  by  the  public  sector  in  most - 28  - 
other  developed  countries.  As  the  costs  of  benefits  rise,  our 
encourages  employers  to  substitute  part-time  and  temporary 
the  share  of  low  earners  and  wage  inequality. 
“privatized”  benefits  system 
low-wage  jobs,  increasing  both 
Few  will,  or  should,  oppose  the  Labor  Department’s  “get  smart”  policies  for  workers, 
but  the  reality  is  that  changes  in  the  ability  of  workers  to  provide  the  skills  needed  in 
technologically  advanced  workplaces  had  little  to  do  with  the  startling  growth  in  poverty- 
wage  jobs,  the  drop  in  real  earnings,  and  the  growth  of  earnings  inequality  in  the  1980’s.  We 
need  to  improve  our  education  and  training  system,  but  making  workers  smarter  will  not,  by 
itself,  have  much  impact  on  the  distribution  of  earnings  - certainly  not  in  the  next  decade. 
Besides,  most  jobs  will  continue  to  require  less  than  a college  degree,  and  a labor  market  that 
increasingly  offers  poverty-wage  jobs  to  these  workers  provides  them  with  little  incentive  to 
invest  in  education  and  training,  no  matter  how  well  we  design  and  implement  the  programs. 
Equally  important,  low  wage  employment  strategies  and  high  levels  of job  insecurity  are  an 
unlikely  recipe  for  developing  a competitive  economy  of  high  performance  workplaces. 
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Table  1:  Characteristics  of  High  Growth  Occcupations  With  More  Than  400,000 
Workers  in  1988” 
*Occupations  projected  by  BLS  to  increase  by  at  least  24%  between  1988  and  2000. - 33  - 
Table  2: Characteristics  of Declining  Occupations  With More  Than 
400,000  Employees  in  1988* 
Occupation 
Typists 
Years  of  Hourly 
Education  Wage 







Data-entry  Keyers  12.9  7.96  13,734  95.8 
Child  Care  Workers,  pvt  HH  11.3  2.86  2,183  97.4 
Cleaners  &  Servants,  pvt  HH  10.5  5.27  4,598  96.4 
Farm  Workers  10.3  4.04  5,563  26.4 
Metal  working  Machine  Oper’s  11.6  10.0  19,908  18.7 
Textile  &  App’l  Mach.  Oper’s  10.4  5.53  9,644  79.3 
Assemblers  11.2  8.22  15,082  48.2 
Welders  and  Cutters  11.6  11.02  20,908  7.1 
Industrial  Equipment  Operators  I  11.1  I 9.82  I  19,450  7.3 
*Occupations  projected  by  BLS  to  decline  between  1988  and  2000. - 34 - 
Table 3: Projected  Employment  Growth  in the  1990’s 
For Occupation  Groups  Defined  by Earnings  and 
Education  Levels in 1988 
Occ Groups 
1. Poverty 
2.  Low-Wage/ 
Low  Educ’n 
occs  Empl  Hourly  Annual  EdLlC  Share  Growth 
Share  Wage  Earnings  Level  Female  1988 - 
1988  1988  1988  1989  1989  2000 
39  16.7  5.20  6,159  11.9  62.8  17.6 
27  7.1  6.76  11,268  11.7  56.4  8.8 
3.  Low-Wage/  17  12.6  7.40  11,787  13.2  81.3  16.7 
High  Educ’n 
4.  Mod-Wage/  63  28.0  9.10  17,080  11.8  20.8  13.1 
Low  Educ’n 
5.  Mod-Wage/  52  19.6  11.73  22,398  15.0  59.1  21.3 
High  Educ’n 
6.  High  Wage  29  16.0  15.09  32,935  14.8  29.7  24.4 
Total  227  100  9.54  17,751  13.1  46.9  17.4 
Sourrce:  March  1989 Current  Population  Survey  and “Outlook  2000” Bulletin  2352, U.S. 
Department  of Labor,  April  1990, pp.  50-58. 
Included  in the Table  are individuals  who  were between  16 and 65 in  1989 with  wage and 
salary  work  experience  in  1988. The  227 occupations  were those  in the  CPS that matched 
occupations  used by  BLS. Excluded  are farmers  and a variety  of  small  occupations  (less than 
25,000  workers)  that  BLS does not  project.  Occupation  groups  were  defined  on the basis of 
average  annual  earnings  and educational  attainment  (highest  grade  attended).  Poverty  earnings 
are defined  as less than  $9,436, the poverty  line  for a nonfarm  family  of  3 in  1988. Low 
earnings  are defined  as $9,436 - $14,154  (1.5 times the poverty  line);  moderate  earnings: 
$14,154  - $28,308  (twice  the poverty  line);  high  earnings:  greater  than  $28,308.  Low 
education  and high  education  occupations  are those whose average  attainment  is below  and 




Figure 1: Non-Production  Workers Share in Total  Employment 
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Figure 2a: Variances  of Earnings, Education,  and Skill Variables 
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Figure 2c: Variances  of Earnings,  Education, and Skill  Variables 
Hourly  Earnings for All Wage & Salary  Earners, 19754990  (Business  Services) 
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Wage and Low Skill Shares 
Employment,  197590 
_ 
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Source:  March  CPS.  Includes  ages  16-39. 
Low  Wage:  c 1.5  l poverty  wage. 
Low  Skill:  12  years  of  Educ’n  or  less. 
Figure 4: Low Wage and Low Skill Shares 











Low  Wage  Workers  Low  Skill  Workers 
Source:  March  CPS.  Includes  ages  16-39. 
Low  Wage:  cl.5  l poverty  wage 
Low  Skill:  !2  years  of  educ’n  or  less. 60 
Figure 5: Low Wage and Low Skill Shares 
of Service  Sector  Employment,  1975-90 
Porcont 
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Source:  March  CPS.  Includes  ages  16-39. 
Low  wage:  cl.5  l poverty  wage. 
Low  skill:  12  years  of  Educ’n  or  less. 
Figure 6: The  Number and Share of Low 
Wage Workers  With More Than a 
High School  Degree, 1975-90 
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wlth  work  experience.  Low  wages  are 
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